Savage Morality
(Click here for a pdf version)
Clarence Williams, February 12, 2007
www.clarencewilliams.net
Moral character is a revered trait, so important that we reserve social offices for people exhibiting it. But what does it mean to be moral? In answer, most people casually throw out various character descriptors such as honest, consistent, steadfast, compassionate, modest, charitable, forgiving, pious, etc. Upon serious reflection, though, we discover that these are vague, and therefore meaningless. Will any deity serve for pious displays? Is compassion reserved for the likes of Mother Theresa, or charitable for those who give away their entire fortune? Is modesty prudery? Does forgiving mean turn the other cheek? Steadfastness can become stubbornness, while honesty is sometimes harmful—little white lies are often kind. Law-abiding is often added, but it’s inadequate as well. We jaywalk, drive too fast, etc., and religious leaders disobey the law against political activism from the pulpit, saying they obey a higher law.
Hundreds of philosophers over the centuries have wrestled with the concept, trying to give us a universal definition of morality or ethics, but they needn’t have bothered. Despite the inadequacy of attempts to put it into words, we all know it when we see it, and not because of any positive attributes, but because we understand the heart of its alter ego, immorality. An immoral act elicits a pronounced, visceral response, boiling our blood as we wonder how anyone could behave like that. We don’t think about defining it, explaining it or wondering how many others share our reaction, we just... well, we just feel in our gut that it’s immoral.
Examples of immorality are easy to imagine (at least someone’s). When we see women treated as chattels and young girls denied an education, we revile the men enforcing such things. Likewise, we harbor deep animosity for women who veil themselves from head to toe, thereby abetting a culture that forces all women to do the same. When we see an adulteress stoned or the hand of a beggar thief severed, we’re outraged. We’re sickened when a mother lauds her suicide bomber child, while a woman choosing an abortion invites crowds literally foaming at the mouth in righteous indignation. We’re repulsed by the thought of homosexual acts, and not only deny gays marriage, but beat and even kill them if their public expressions are excessive. Those using racial slurs are not just boorish, but must be stopped at great cost. Inter-racial couples are shunned and sneered at. Pedophilia and rape are inexplicable acts of free will calling for no mercy, while drug abusers are social pariahs needing incarceration. Polygamy and arranged marriages are abominations, while pre-marital sex evokes negative feelings no less passionate. Infidelity is a detestable crime, and divorce in the absence of infidelity taboo. Scientists experimenting on animals receive death threats, women wearing animal fur are splashed with paint, and those exploring the benefits of fetal stem cells are declared murderers. Eating dogs, cats and horses is repulsive. Businesses moving into pristine forests invite firebombs, while those of wealth in the face of poverty are equally condemned. We demand international institutions prevent child labor, enforce universal limits on the age of consent, and put an end to religious indoctrination in schoolrooms. Caricatures of prophets bring death sentences, and a loud, “goddamn,” at the wrong time and place brings a jail sentence. Prostitutes are always coerced, so their johns are evil predators, while pornographers and their audience are similarly vile. Rap artists mouthing obscene lyrics while grabbing their crotch solicit demands for censure. Not only is public nudity criminalized, but young women are expelled from school for immodest dress.
Clearly, when morals are invoked the stakes are high. There seems no such thing as a minor moral transgression, only moral outrage. Why does a judgment of immorality evoke such an elevated response when neither we nor hundreds of philosophers can adequately define it? The only answer fitting all the data lies in evolved human nature, and this evolutionary view of morality provides a surprising revelation: morality evokes unexplainable, visceral feelings because it is, indeed, primal in nature, a relic of our savage past, and should be expunged from our vocabulary.
A natural explanation of morality begins with the basic human instinct of satisfying needs, starting with personal survival and reproductive success. At a higher level, we are social animals. All of us, with rare exceptions, lose our minds in isolation. Other humans are usually instrumental to personal fulfillment, and they are also the source of most frustration, which is the essence of the moral dilemma. Prominent among human social behavior is social exchange, or cooperation for mutual benefit, also called altruism. In evolutionary terms, an altruist benefits another’s fitness at a fitness cost to himself, with fitness defined in terms of reproductive success, the perpetuation of one’s genes. Evolution through natural selection should not favor such behavior, but altruism survives in many species, and is widespread among humans. Understanding why explains morality.
Perhaps complex altruism began when an animal noted a hungry, unrelated group member, and considered the implications. This observer possessed the parental investment instinct common to many species, which is the most ancient of all sharing, impelling very costly efforts to ensure the survival of offspring. This animal also carried related genes predisposing it to share with close relatives, who also share its genes (but fewer of them than offspring, which means the seductive power of the instinctive impulse to share decreases as the relative becomes more distant). This particular animal, though, was special, having a new genetic anomaly of some sort, maybe a mutation in one of the suite of genes creating ancient sharing behavior (behavior is polygenic, influenced by more than one gene, and evolution builds on existing structures, in this case the cognitive architecture).
This genetic twist on ancient behavior predisposed this creature to make a value judgment and share his (or her) hard-won bounty with this hungry non-relative, thinking the conspecific would do likewise when fortunes were turned. After all, kin usually reciprocated, which acted to make the fitness cost of sharing less than the exchanged benefit. This imaginary creature was undoubtedly not a hominid since many animals engage in simple sharing, and even creatures as lowly as the bat share food with unrelated group members. The net effect was improved fitness for the sharer, a decided reproductive advantage in a harsh environment of unpredictable resource acquisition. As an evolutionary adaptation, the genetic anomaly eventually spread so that it characterized the entire population (individual exceptions can persist, as we’ll see below with cheaters). This simple sharing behavior is called kin selection in the case of relatives, and direct reciprocity when sharing involves non-kin with whom we frequently interact (thereby ensuring they return the favor or suffer debilitating consequences).
But the level of cooperation common to humans is unique, going well beyond these two simple altruisms. Unlike any other animal, we cooperate with unrelated individuals with whom we don’t expect to regularly interact. Even ancient humans evidenced labor specialization, widespread trading, and acts of caring for the sick, hungry, and disabled. This advanced level of cooperation is called indirect reciprocity. Those who think all human behavior is learned, or culturally transmitted, are comfortable with this, but so are evolutionary scientists, even though it appears the altruistic behavior carries a net fitness cost and should not have survived. The key is reputation, which is spread by language (gossip) to all members of the group, even those never directly interacting with the altruist. A reputation for helping others, even strangers who might never return the favor, is rewarded by others, and is thus a fitness-enhancing attribute, which, of course, is necessary for genetic survival. The fitness benefits provided to others by cooperation must always be less than the fitness costs of providing it.
This complex social activity requires significant cognitive capacity, as we must not only remember our own interactions, but also monitor the group’s ever-changing social network. It was critical to the survival of the species Homo sapiens, as we filled what has been called the “cognitive niche.” This matches what anthropological evidence reveals about the increasing size of the human brain, particularly the cortex, thus lending credibility to the evolution of complex social behavior (the cortex is the brain’s “management center,” where conflicting signals from various cognitive modules specialized for narrow spectrums of the environment are resolved). But evolutionists encountered a problem with indirect reciprocity. Sophisticated computer modeling of evolutionary processes demonstrated that genes favoring this advanced altruistic behavior should eventually be replaced by wholly selfish genes. Non-cooperative behavior, that is freeloading or cheating, “won out” in this simulated race for fitness advantages (which works because the brain is a complex computational devise much like a computer, and genetic infiltration within a population a matter of mathematics). How had humans evolved such complex cooperative behavior?
This conundrum bedeviled evolutionary scientist for many years—could those suggesting cultural transmission of all human behavior be right? The problem was solved by considering that for the thousands of generations toiling in the Pleistocene, when modern humans evolved, groups were characterized by limited migration and fierce competition for scarce resources, and mostly from other human groups (Homo sapiens dominated the environment at this stage in their evolution). This view is established from archeological records and reinforced by another unique human trait, our group rivalry. Human savagery in competition has no parallel among social mammals (only our closest relative, the chimpanzee, is known to sometimes be equally savage in conspecific group competition). Again using mathematical modeling, evolutionists found that genes for altruistic behavior could survive in this Pleistocene environment if they coevolved with behavior favoring “culturally transmitted norms [,which supported] resource and information sharing, consensus decision-making, collective restraints on would-be aggrandizers, monogamy, and other reproductive leveling practices that reduced within-group differences in fitness.”1 The “collective restraints on would-be aggrandizers” means the evolution of skills for detecting and punishing cheaters, or non-reciprocators.
These necessary conditions (the absence of any swings the modeled fitness balance back to freeloading) combine to reduce the fitness advantages of non-cooperators, which allowed a group exhibiting altruistic behavior to dominate competing groups not exhibiting the cooperative behavior of the “altruism-infused” group. In fact, these altruists would drive neighboring groups to extinction, further illustrating the derivation of human savagery. Thus, this sort of “group selection” (a misused term, since natural selection only works on individuals) allowed instinctive altruism to flourish in humans. Ultimately, domestication of animals and then agriculture meant groups of cooperators significantly increased their numbers.
It is important to note that the first of these conditions, culturally transmitted norms, says nothing specific about them other than that they support what is essentially group solidarity (which serves as fitness-leveling). Not only did physical characteristics count as a critical cue for “in group” versus “out group” members, but so did the cultural mores. This is the key to understanding morality, and among the first of these culturally transmitted norms was probably religious behavior.
It is informative, therefore, to understand how religions evolved. Counterintuitive metaphysical belief systems (religions) did not evolve, but are by-products of several evolved behaviors, most important among them (other than altruism) being agency detection and theory of mind. Animate agents, things that exhibit goal-directed behavior, can be predator, social foe, prey or mate. Reacting quickly to them was often the difference between life and death, and assuming the agent is directed by its mind allows us to make predictions about its behavior. In the absence of knowledge, we over-attribute agency to objects, our Pleistocene forebears even more so. Thus, gods, ghosts and demons were contrived as all-knowing, watchful agents responsible for unexplained events, and not only demanding adoration or fear but establishing moral values. Today, children too young to have been inculcated with cultural mores exhibit behavior likening them to “intuitive theists,”2 providing clear evidence such supernatural beliefs are instinctive.
The mental processes associated with supernaturalism are either subconsciously employed or overwhelm the cortex’s deliberative reasoning (many behaviors share this non-deliberative characteristic, such as sexual attraction, anger, racial encoding, etc.). Religious beliefs were institutionalized for better transmission and integrity, and they flourished as powerful enforcers of cultural norms—the spirits are looking so cooperate! From these, religions sprang, with communally ritualized representations of these counterintuitive beliefs, and which are led by specially anointed human authorities (shamans, prophets and Popes). With evolutionary roots, it is no wonder religions around the world show common characteristics.
The characteristic of religious behavior that is important to morality is its “in group” versus “out group” nature. If you’re “in” and therefore a cooperator critical to the group’s survival, you’ll practice “my” religious behavior. If you don’t, you’re probably a dangerous foe. This hardened, cognitive predisposition need not be limited to spiritual behavior.
Cultural norms are transmitted via socialization, the process by which the young acquire the habits, beliefs, and accumulated knowledge of society, its social mores. Parents, siblings, playmates and other group members teach or otherwise influence the behavior children freely adopt. The ancient purpose of socialization was to teach the young how to survive, but, as discussed above, it also served as fitness leveling in human society. As a result, socialization messages have an especially powerful impact, none more so than religious codes. It is not surprising, then, that most children adopt their parent’s religion. Coded values, mores, or morality are transmitted culturally but hardwired behavior (evolved, genetically-constructed) sends them to especially hardened, relatively inaccessible places in our brain (emotionally-dominated behavior can be traced through functional magnetic resonance imaging). Hence counterintuitive, counterfactual beliefs persist, if not literally at least ritualistically. Most Catholics don’t really believe the wafer and wine proffered by the Priest is the body and blood of Christ. And most people don’t have a strong reason to reject their belief in a counterfactual, supernatural deity, at least one powerful enough to offset the instinctive, near-rabid affinity to social mores, to the “in group’s” values. Thick armor not only guards these transmitted values from corruption but predisposes us to express strong negative reactions to another group’s norms.
One more aspect of socialization is critical to note: modern society has dramatically altered it. Today, the community with which we must interact is far removed from our immediate one. Modern, intermingled communities are huge in number and widespread, thus challenging direct or even indirect reciprocity. Furthermore, mass media has become influential in communicating habits, beliefs and knowledge. Today, children confront social mores from far-flung places and from non-traditional teachers. Not even relatively isolated communities are immune from this new, complex and imperfect process. Complicating this, today’s individuals are necessarily mobile. Thus, a homogenously behaving generation scatters and enters communities with different standards, thereby “corrupting” them, or an individual develops an affinity with another hardened group, and is swept up in the passion of their value expressions (e.g., environmentalists, animal lovers, anarchists). The consequence of conflicting values from so many other groups taps into our instinctive fears, resulting in an even more rigid strain of moral certitude, a virulent guarding of the “in group’s” values (e.g., Christian “traditional values”).
What then can we conclude about morality? It is a by-product of altruism and group solidarity, which had survival value for ancient humans. As a result, your group’s morals are consigned to a hardened place in your brain, which evolution has designed to bypass the cortex’s deliberative, reasonable calculations. Therefore, morality is unreasonable, or reasonable by accident, an evolutionary relic of meaner times, which accounts for its visceral nature and ferocious defense.
This paints a bleak picture of eternal strife between competing groups, each a bastion of its own moral values, but there is hope. The advanced human cognitive features (primarily the enlarged cortex) that (ironically) gave rise to morality and the savage expansion of its possessors also permits visions of Utopian scale, allows us to transcend many proclivities. But this genetic predisposition for transcendental musings can be distorted or stunted by the environment, which includes cultural forces. Thus, these areas of higher cognition must be nurtured in order to reach their natural level of maturity and acuity. We nurture them through our instinctive curiosity, our eager exploration of the world, but this too can be stunted by forces such as cultural myopia or learning that assumes the character of indoctrination, religious or otherwise.
It is time to reject morality, carve it from our vocabulary as savagely as it was implanted, and construct socialization systems that emphasize diversity. By so doing, we are better equipped to call upon our higher cognitive faculties, and extend tolerance to those whose cooperative behavior has a character different than our own. After all, most cultural norms, our moral values, have never served a purpose beyond distinguishing “us” from “them,” and like it or not “us” now includes the whole world, not just a small group of humans whose narrowly-defined norms had adaptive value, served to permit the survival of genes for complex cooperation, but which also demanded savage combat with neighbors, “them.” We can still construct local laws to accommodate narrow values, but declaring them moral is a savage construct.
1 Samuel Bowles, “Group Competition, Reproductive Leveling, and the Evolution of Human Altruism,” Science, Volume 314, 8 December 2006, pp. 1569-1572
2 Debora Kelemen (2004), “Are children ‘intuitive theists’?: Reasoning about purpose and design in nature,” Psychological Science, Volume 15, Number 5, May 2004, pp. 295-301.